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SECURITIES LAWS IN HAVEN JURISDICTIONS
I. Introduction
The year 1986 did not bode well for investment banker Dennis
Levine. In a civil injunctive action' the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) alleged that Levine, through an insider trading
scheme, violated several antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.2 Without admitting or denying that he obtained over $12
million in illicit profits from secretly trading in the securities of fifty-four
companies, the brazen Levine settled the SEC action and was ordered to
disgorge over $10 million to the court.'
Ostensibly, this judgment is a footnote to 1980s avarice. A more
critical look, however, reveals legally-sanctioned instruments that threaten
the integrity of securities markets everywhere. Levine executed his
unlawful trades through two Panamanian shell companies and a Bahamian
bank account For some time, these nondisclosure instruments provided
Levine with access to U.S. securities markets and anonymity from U.S.
securities regulators.'
More disturbing is the fact that if the offshore bankers had not
destroyed various documents in their attempt to scuttle the initial SEC
inquiry, Levine might never have been incarcerated.6 By destroying
documents, the bank made itself vulnerable to U.S. prosecution for
obstruction of justice. The destruction of evidence placed the bankers in
a legal cul-de-sac. Had the bankers avoided this cloak and dagger
episode, they would have done nothing illegal and at the very least, the
SEC would have been tied up for years in the Bahamian courts trying to
force disclosure of Levine's name. Levine was apprehended because a
variety of circumstances fermented and not through any comprehensive
regulation of haven7 jurisdictions. Serendipity was a prominent element
in Levine's ultimate apprehension.
This anecdote represents the potential bottleneck that U.S. securities
regulators face when investigating insider trading violations commenced
in haven jurisdictions. When an alleged securities law violation is being
investigated, the SEC typically requests trading information from the
1. SEC v. Levine, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92717 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd and remanded
on other grounds, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-80c-3 (1988).
3. See SEC v. Levine, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92717 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev 'dand remanded
on other grounds, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. J. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 242 (1991).
7. The terms "haven" and "offshore" will be used interchangeably throughout this article.
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broker involved and its customer. Yet, where the customer is a bank
located in a foreign country - that is, where the bank trades on behalf
of an investor for whom it acts as custodian - the request is often denied
on the ground that disclosure would violate bank secrecy laws.'
The purpose of this article is to analyze bank secrecy and regulatory
disclosure, two conflicting objectives that arise in the situation where
voluntary compliance with an SEC request for customer information is
refused by reason of bank secrecy law. Part II, through an analysis of the
relevant case law, illustrates how offshore courts actively resist U.S.
attempts to undermine their sovereignty on the issue of bank secrecy.
Given this reluctance to release information, Part III critically evaluates
litigation, one of the principal methods U.S. authorities have used to
extract information. In light of the internationalization of markets, Part
IV concludes by initiating discussion on how the competing objectives of
preserving customer confidentiality and disclosing offshore trading
information should be resolved.
II. Barriers to Regulation
A. Overview
U.S. case law generously supports the assertion that bank secrecy
laws inhibit the supervision of securities markets.9 The preponderance
of academic literature examines the offshore problem from the view of
the frustrated securities regulator. When the literature does examine the
problem from the perspective of the haven jurisdiction, it often entails an
analysis of civil law provisions.'o The purpose of this section, however,
is to illustrate, using the Bahamas as a case study, how a common law
secrecy haven justifies the primacy of the banker's duty of secrecy over
a foreign subpoena to produce documents in a foreign court. For the
sake of clarity, this section divides its discussion into six substantive sub-
sections. Subpart B examines the common problem faced by haven
banks that execute transactions on U.S. securities markets, namely an
8. Bank secrecy laws protect the confidentiality of information held by financial institutions.
These laws prohibit the disclosure of bank customer identity, business records, and other details
relating to a customer's bank account. EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE No. 21186 (July 30, 1984),
reprinted in [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,980.
9. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); SEC v. Levine, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92717 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera
Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y., 1981).
10. See, e.g., Bernhard F. Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and its Legal Implications in the
United States, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 18 (1978).
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exposure to U.S. court orders and liability to civil and criminal penalties
in the haven. Subpart C identifies the institutional rationales for bank
secrecy. Against this backdrop, subparts D through G offer a clinical
analysis of common law bank secrecy in the Bahamas, specifically
demonstrating how offshore courts negatively respond to the thinly-veiled
attempts of U.S. authorities to undermine their sovereignty on the issue
of bank secrecy with investigative subpoenas.
B. The Problem: Jurisdictional Conflict
The international marketplace dictates that multinational enterprises
must necessarily function in at least two sovereign states to remain
competitive. When the laws of those two or more states conflict, the
enterprise's legal responsibilities become more onerous."1 This conflict
is apparent in bank secrecy laws, insofar as many banks maintain offices
in countries around the world. Frequently, issues involving the affairs of
a customer arise in state A concerning his transactions in the offshore
jurisdiction of state B. For example, the New York office of a U.S. bank
may be asked by a U.S. court to supply customer information kept at its
Nassau office. This information, however, enjoys privileged status under
Bahamian secrecy laws. Operating under two jurisdictions, - the U.S.
jurisdiction, under which the bank maintains its headquarters and the
Bahamian jurisdiction, where the requested information is kept - the
bank is in a most unenviable position. In short, the bank is caught
between Scylla and Charybdis.
Hence, jurisdictional questions, coupled with issues of sovereignty,
vex multinational banking enterprises. It is worthwhile, therefore, to
begin by considering some of the theoretical aspects of jurisdiction and
sovereignty before an analysis is undertaken of their practical
implications.
It is said that sovereignty constitutes the supreme authority in an
independent political society.'" The related concept of jurisdiction can
be defined as the capacity of a state under international law to govern
people and property by its municipal law.'" It includes both the power
to make laws (prescriptive jurisdiction) and the power to ensure
compliance with them (enforcement jurisdiction). 4 The question of
jurisdiction was addressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice
11. Henry Harfield, The Implications of U.S. Extraterritorial Discovery Proceedings Against
Multinational Corporations for the Judiciary, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 973, 974 (1984).
12. WILLIAM W. BISHOP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1971).
13. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (4th ed. 1991).
14. Id.
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in the Lotus Case.I" Here, the court determined that "the first and
foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a state is that..
it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another
state."' 6
Orthodox positions on jurisdiction and sovereignty have, to some
extent, been realigned in light of more recent concepts such as the effects
doctrine. This doctrine is characterized by the approach that, irrespective
of where the conduct in question occurs, if it sufficiently affects a state's
trading markets, jurisdictional assertion is justified. 7 The United States
has aggressively employed this doctrine. The classic statement of the
American doctrine is found in United States v. Aluminum Company of
America," in which the court claimed that "any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside
its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends."' 9  While other grounds for claiming jurisdiction can be
advanced, the effects doctrine remains the most prevalent basis used by
the United States to justify the extraterritorial application of its laws. E°
Notwithstanding any theoretical objections that could be advanced
against the effects doctrine, the practical implications are that it largely
ignores the concerns of other jurisdictions. A cursory examination of the
•definition of extraterritoriality emphasizes the.point. Extraterritoriality.
may be defined as "[a] legal fiction by which certain persons and things
are deemed for the purpose of jurisdiction and control to be outside the
territory of the State in which they really are and within that of some
other State."'" It should come as no surprise, then, that extraterritorial
reach is often viewed as an assault on the other state's sovereignty. As
implied above, inherent in the definition of enforcement jurisdiction is
that a state's judicial reach is limited by its territorial boundaries. The
effects doctrine operates as an exception to this principle. In matters of
economic significance, however, states are simply unwilling to concede
elements of their sovereignty to another state.
The issue of Bahamian sovereignty in the financial services sphere,
for example, has been jealously guarded by the Bahamian judiciary. The
most recent decision of the Bahamian Supreme Court,. Re Bank of
15. 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1927).
16. M.I. DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 (1990).
17. Id. at 443-44.
18. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
19. Id. at 443.
20. Donald K. Charter & Stanley M. Beck, Q.C., Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational
Securities Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 467, 469 (1987).
21. R. BIRD, OSBORN'S CONCISE LAW DIcTnoNARY 142 (7th ed. 1983).
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America,22 illustrates the commitment of the judiciary to bank secrecy
laws. Here, the court embraced the principles of economic sovereignty
attested to by James Smith, Governor of the Central Bank of the
Bahamas.23 Smith argued that the banking industry was one of the
largest and most important sectors of the economy and if the industry's
success was to continue, it was imperative that bank secrecy be
maintained.24 In particular, Smith believed that "[t]he country's success
in providing offshore financial services has been impaired by seriously
increased competition internationally during the last decade. To engender
investments in the offshore financial sector and remain competitive, the
confidentiality of financial transactions must be preserved.,
25
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the question of jurisdiction
is complex. It attempts to assimilate the conflicting principles of state
sovereignty, equality of states, and non-intervention in the domestic
affairs of other states. The extent to which states police financial fraud
will necessarily be based on their willingness to do so, as well as their
practical capabilities. Although international law concepts ofjurisdiction
assist in supplying a new classification of potential theories, in practice,
it is the actions states pursue that provide the critical insight.26 For this
reason, Subparts D through G provide a clinical assessment of Bahamian
practice in dealing with U.S. subpoenas and Part III discusses actual SEC
practices.
C. Institutional Justifications for Bank Secrecy
Apart from the common law duty of secrecy, 27 institutional or
entrenched justifications for bank secrecy are rooted in civilian
jurisprudence. For analytical purposes, the justifications can be grouped
into three categories: (1) the preservation of confidential relationships;
(2) the protection of financial assets; and (3) the enhancement of the
domestic banking industry.28




26. J. Breslin, Extraterritorial Control of Securities Fraud 14 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
on file at the University of Cambridge) (copy on file with author).
27. See infra part II.F.
28. Harvey L. Pitt et al., Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market, 9 U.
PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 315, 405-06 (1987); see also J. SUTER, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER DEALING
IN BRITAIN 356 (1989).
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Principles of bank secrecy originated in'early Roman and Germanic
law as an aspect of the right to privacy.2 9 Many civil law jurisdictions
have since considered financial privacy to be a central tenet of individual
liberty and freedom. The Swiss Civil Code and the Code of Obligations,
for example, recognize that every individual is entitled to Geheimsphare
(a sphere of secrecy) that is protected against public disclosure.3" One
of the individual rights within the Geheimsphare is bank secrecy.'
Financial security is among the most important reasons advanced for
bank secrecy laws.32 Because there is generally no taxation or exchange
control in the Gulf states, two prevailing reasons for the use of bank
secrecy jurisdictions, one could assert that financial security is the only
explanation for the considerable flow of funds both to and through
Switzerland from the Middle East."
The skeptic, however, would argue that although bank secrecy
historically has been a legitimate response to the sanctity of individual
rights, the enduring vitality of bank secrecy can be attributed to economic
factors.34 The leaders of developing countries need only perform a brief
study of Switzerland to see that its bank secrecy laws have made it one
of the world's leading financial centers. Understandably, many countries
would like to emulate Switzerland's success.
D. Case Study of Common Law Bank Secrecy Haven- The Bahamas
A number of bank secrecy havens permeate the globe. In order to
effect a detailed analysis of common law bank secrecy per se, rather than
execute a descriptive survey of the various bank secrecy havens that exist,
this article will focus on one jurisdiction. The Bahamas is salient for
three reasons. First, a number of U.S. cases suggests that the jurisdiction
has played a notable role in both the concealment of insider trading and
29. See, e.g., EDOUARD CHAMBOST, A WORLD GUIDE TO CONFIDENTIALITY (1983). Chambost
is a French lawyer who has written extensively on offshore banking.
30. J. Liftin, Our Playing Field, Our Rules: An Analysis of the SEC's Waiver by Conduct
Approach, 11 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 530 (1985).
31. Id.
32. CHAMBOST, supra note 29, at 10.
33. See CHAMBOST, supra note 29. Cf. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. II1
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). This case demonstrated that Kuwaiti businessmen indeed found stability in Swiss
banks. However, they also found anonymity to purchase call options with inside information.
Accordingly, Chambost's affirmation must be questioned.
34. In 1983, over 425 banks were operating in the Cayman Islands. Their initial and annual
licensing fees accounted for 20% of the colony's budget. In 1964, the Cayman Islands had two local
banks and practically no offshore business. Ostensibly, the change in fortunes is due to the 1966
enactment of bank secrecy legislation. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, CRIME AND SECRECY: THE USE OF
OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES 30-31, app. 3 (1983).
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the laundering of illicit funds.35 Second, the Bahamas is strategically
placed to offer offshore financial services. Geographically, the Bahamas
is situated between two affluent continents, with Canada and the United
States to the north and Central and South America, with their petrodollars
and emerging securities markets to the south.36 On a temporal plane,
the Bahamas falls within the eastern time zone, home to the New York
Stock Exchange. Third, the financial services industry is the cause
cjl~bre of the Bahamian economy." Indeed, the Bahamian financial
services industry is committed to entrench bank secrecy, as it is perceived
to be a pillar of financial development.38 The view of many in the
Bahamian financial services industry is perhaps best summarized by
analogy to the Swiss position, explained by Alfred Sarasin, former
President of the Swiss Association of Bankers: "The Swiss financial
position is not a product of banking secrecy. But if it did not exist, our
country would no longer be a serious competitor in the international
competition between the financial centres of the world."3 9  The same
35. See, e.g., SEC v. Levine, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92717 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cit. 1989); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,
691 F.2d 1384 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); United States v. Becker, 569
F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir., 1976).
36. R. JOHNS, TAX HAVENS AND OFFSHORE FINANCE 191 (1983).
37. In the late 1980s, Prime Minister Pindling initiated a program of new financial legislation
aimed at winning back customers lost to rival offshore jurisdictions. To oversee the program, a
Financial Services Secretariat was established within the Ministry of Finance to, among other things,
identify and encourage all types of financial services available within the Bahamas - whether in
banking law, accounting, insurance, corporate and trust services and tax avoidance.
38. Confidentiality, the foundation of bank secrecy, permeates Nassau's -Bay Street, the
Bahamian equivalent of the Square Mile. The Bahamian attitude is conveniently summarized in a
1977 speech given by Donald Fleming, former president of the Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company,
to the Bahamian Chamber of Commerce:
The secrecy attached to relations and transactions between financial institutions and their
clients has been another factor essential in the attraction of financial business.... Any
lessening of this guarantee would harm the interests of the Bahamas, and any
strengthening of it would bolster them.
Donald Fleming, Former President of the Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company of the Bahamas,
Address Before the Bahamian Chamber of Commerce (1977).
Recent legislative evidence of the commitment to secrecy is found in the International Business
Companies Act of 1990 [hereinafter IBC Act]. GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE
BAHAMAS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss COMPANIES OF THE BAHAMAS 7 (1990). An IBC is a
Bahamian-incorporated company that does not carry on business in the Bahamas. Id. There are two
main aspects of an IBC that afford the members of a company a high degree of confidentiality:
(1) There is no requirement for the filing of annual returns, and thus, the names of shareholders are
not registered for public inspection; and (2) The actual records that the company is required to keep
by the IBC Act may be kept at a company's registered office - shielded from public inspection.
Id.
39. Alfred Sarasin, Former President of the Swiss Association of Bankers, Address at Bankers'
Day in the Kursaal in Berne (Sept. 22, 1978) (copy on file with author).
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rationale could be asserted on behalf of the Bahamian judicial approach
to the banking industry.
Apart from the institutional justifications for bank secrecy offered
above, it is necessary to examine in greater detail the two-pronged
machinery utilized by the Bahamas to maintain the vitality of their haven
jurisdiction. The haven status is perpetuated through Bahamian statutory
guidelines and a robust judicial approach to preserving banker/customer
confidentiality. Case law will be interpreted within the context of the
four Tournier qualifications outlined below.
E. Bahamian Statutory Duty of Bank Secrecy
Banks doing business in the Bahamas are governed by the Banks and
Trust Companies Regulations Act of 1965 [hereinafter the Bank Act].40
Section 10, the substantive secrecy provision of the Bank Act, provides
that banks must maintain as secret, information concerning their
affairs.41 Section 10 is the only legislative enactment of the Bahamas
preserving a duty of confidence in banker/customer relationships.
Specifically, under section 10(1), disclosure is prohibited by any
person who has "acquired information in his capacity as director, officer,
employee or agent of any licensee or former licensee." '42 In addition to
forbidding a bank employee from disclosing "information relating to the
identity, assets, liabilities, transactions, and accounts of a customer's bank
account,, 43 the Bank Act equally prohibits the release of information
after employment is terminated.44
Every person who violates the section 10(1) duty of secrecy "shall
be guilty of an offense against this Act and shall be liable on summary
conviction to a fine not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars or to a term
of imprisonment not exceeding two years or to both such fine and
imprisonment., 45 In addition to the criminal penalties for disclosure, the
bank is exposed to the possibility of a lawsuit for breach of contract.
46
If, however, a bank is contemplating disclosure only for the purpose of
answering a subpoena in a foreign court, the customer can obtain an
injunction.47 Thus, the rational banker will balk at disclosure because
40. Banks and Trust Companies Regulations Act, 1965 (amended 1980) (Bah.).
41. Id. s. 10.
42. Id. s. 10(l)(a).
43. Id. s. 10(l)(e).
44. Id. s. 10(l)(a).
45. Banks and Trust Companies Regulations Act, 1965, s. 10 (amended 1980) (Bah.).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., F.D.C. Co. Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., [1990] 1 H.K.L.R. 277 (H.K.).
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of the threat of penalties, civil liability, and, of course, potential damage
to his reputation.
A banker can, however, avoid liability for disclosure if (1) he has
the consent of the customer concerned;4 (2) the performance of his
duties or the exercise of his functions under the Bank Act mandate
disclosure;49 (3) it is required for the performance of his duties within
the scope of his employment;5 .(4) he is lawfully required to make
disclosure by any court of competent jurisdiction within the Bahamas,
5'
or (5) it is required pursuant to the Bahamian common law, as qualified
by the Bank Act.52 Although these statutory exceptions included in
section 10(1) appear broad, it is doubtful that any one of them would
authorize a bank employee to disclose information for the purposes of a
foreign court's subpoena.
F. Bahamian Common Law Duty of Bank Secrecy
The Bahamian common law position is similarly guarded about the
information banks may surrender. It appears that the tenets of the
common law are very much a part of Bahamian law.53 Indeed, appeals
are no longer taken from the Supreme Court of the Bahamas to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 4 Yet, English case law has
great persuasive, if not binding,. effect in the Bahamas. Several English
and Commonwealth cases are useful in illustrating not only the approach
of the Bahamian courts, but also the various approaches to addressing
bank secrecy by other common law haven jurisdictions. Although the
cases cited are principally investigations into tax fraud, similar questions
can arise in relation to. securities law violations.55
At first sight, the legal relationship between banker and customer can
be characterized as that of debtor and creditor. 6 A more critical look,
48. Banks and Trust Companies Regulations Act of 1965, s. 10 (amended 1980) (Bah.).
49. Id. s. 10(1)(e)(i).
50. Id. s. 10(1)(e)(ii).
51. Id. s. 10(l)(e)(iii).
52. Id.
53. Barclay's Bank v. McKinney, Civ. No. 474 (Bah. Sup. Ct. 1979) (unreported) (copy on file
with author). In this judgment of the Supreme Court, it was stated that "[t]he general law of the
Bahamas as to the circumstances in which a bank is justified in disclosihg a customer's account is
the same as the common law of England." Id.
54. This Committee has the power to hear appeals from any Dominion or Dependency of the
Crown in any matter, civil or criminal, except where its jurisdiction has been excluded as regards a
particular country.
55. L. Collins, Banking Secrecy and the Enforcement of Securities Legislation, in CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST IN THE CHANGING FINANCIAL WORLD 84-85 (R. Goode ed., 1986).
56. Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation, [1921] 3 K.B. 110 (Eng.); Foley v. Hill, 9 Eng.
Rep. 1002 (1849) (Eng.). No duty of confidentiality is attached to the normal relationship of debtor
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however, reveals that the banker's duty to keep secret the affairs of his
customer is well-established in English jurisprudence." To appreciate
this duty of secrecy, it is important to note that it indeed comprises
elements of agency. 8 As a general rule, an agent is obligated to offer
loyalty and confidentiality to his principal. 9 Although the scope of the
agent's duty varies according to the nature of the relationship,60 it is
settled law that a banker owes a duty of secrecy to his customer.6'
It has been suggested that the banker's agency relationship and his
corresponding duty of confidentiality can be explained on the basis of
sensible economic policy. 62 Through its role as paymaster and receiver
of amounts due, the bank has access to intimate details regarding its
customers' financial transactions. A banker must not abuse this access,
or trust,63 by revealing his customers' financial affairs.
Notwithstanding the historical and economic basis of the obligation
to keep bank transactions confidential, the duty of secrecy is not absolute,
but qualified. Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of
England4 is the locus classicus on common law bank secrecy.65
Recently, in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd.66 the House of Lords
asserted that "the correctness of the principles of law stated by the
majority in Tournier's case has not been doubted since the case was
decided. '67 Toumier was a customer of the defendant bank.68 In April
1922, his account was approximately £10 overdrawn.69  Accordingly,
Tournier reached a repayment agreement with the bank.70 On the
agreement, Toumier provided the name and address of his employer,
Kenyon.7  When Toumier defaulted on the agreement, the bank
and creditor. Accordingly, the Tournier judgment is of considerable importance because it held that
a banker does indeed owe a duty of confidentiality, although qualified, to his customer.
57. Hardy v. Veasey, [1868] 3 Ex. 107 (Eng.); Foster v. Bank of London, [1862] 3 F. & F. 214
(Eng.); Tassel v. Cooper, [1850] 9 C.B. 509 (Eng.).
58. E. ELLINGER, MODERN BANKING LAW 96 (1993).
59. Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46 (Eng.).
60. Unlike the company director who may be ordered by a court to testify against his company,
a solicitor has an absolute duty to maintain his client's confidences, see Minter v. Priest, 1930 A.C.
558 (Eng.); O'Rourke v. Darbishire, 1920 A.C. 581 (Eng.).
61. See Parry Jones v. Law Society [19691 1 Ch. 1, 9 (Eng.).
62. See ELLINGER, supra note 58, at 97.
63. R. POWELL, LAW OF AGENCY 25-26 (2d ed. 1961).
64. [1924] L.K.B. 461 (Eng.).
65. M. HAPGOOD, PAGET'S LAW OF BANKING 254 (10th ed. 1990).
66. 1989 W.L.R. 1340 (Eng.).
67. Id. at 1357.
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manager telephoned Kenyon to find out Toumier's home address.7 2 In
conversations with two of Kenyon's directors, the bank manager revealed
the following: (1) Toumier's account was overdrawn; (2) Toumier was
not honoring the repayment agreement; and (3) The bank traced a check
passing from Tournier to a bookmaker and in turn suggested that he was
a gambling addict." Following the conversations, Kenyon refused to
renew Tournier's employment contract.74 Tournier brought an action
against the bank for, among other things, breach of an implied term of
the contract between he and the bank, namely that the contract provided
that the bank would not reveal to third parties the state of his account or
transactions relating to it.
75
At first instance, Mr. Justice Avory and the jury rendered judgment
in favor of the bank.76 Tournier appealed and the Court of Appeal, in
allowing the appeal, held that there was an implied term in the contract
between bank and customer whereby a bank should not divulge to third
parties either the state of a customers account, any of the customer's
transactions with the bank, or any information relating to the customer
acquired by the bank in the keeping of the customer's account.77
Additionally, in his famous judgment, Lord Justicb Bankes stated that
there were circumstances where a bank would be justified in disclosing
its customers' transactions:
At the present day I think it may be asserted with confidence that the
duty [of secrecy] is a legal one arising out of contract, and that the
duty is not absolute but qualified. It is not possible to frame any
exhaustive definition of the duty. The most that can be done is to
classify the qualification and to indicate its limits .... On principle
I think that the qualifications can be classified under four heads: (a)
Where disclosure is under compulsion by law; (b) where there is a
duty to the public to disclose; (c) where the interests of the bank
require disclosure; (d) where the disclosure is made by the express or
implied consent of the customer.78
Through a framework constructed by the four Tournier exceptions, the
following subpart will examine the relevant case law. In so doing, it will
become evident that: (1) It is unlikely that the foreign securities regulator
72. Id.





78. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of England, [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (Eng.).
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will be able to successfully place his request for trading information
within the ambit of any of the four heads; and (2) Although these
qualifications could be interpreted as providing banks subject to a duty
of secrecy with a justification for disclosure, they have nevertheless been
narrowly construed by British and offshore courts.79 Moreover, the
extent to which these four common law qualifications modify the duty of
secrecy imposed by section 10(1) of the Bank Act is still the subject of
developing jurisprudence. According to the Bank Act, "nothing contained
in section [10(1)] shall prejudice or derogate from the rights and duties
subsisting at common law between a licensee and its customer."'8
G. Exceptions to the Bahamian Duty of Bank Secrecy
1. Disclosure Under Compulsion by Law.-In the Bahamas,
bankers' have common law and statutory duties of nondisclosure, to the
extent disclosure is not compelled by other domestic laws."' Note that
compulsion of disclosure by law means a foreign court's compulsion
order is inapplicable. This was decided in Re Standard Chartered
Bank 2 and affirmed again in Re Bank of America."3 A similar view
was expressed by the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong in FD.C. Co. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank.
84
Both of these latter cases cited and affirmed Lord Denning's view
in R. v Grossman.85 In Grossman, Denning asserted that the Nassau or
Hong Kong Branch of a multijurisdictional bank must be considered a
separate entity from the head office in New York. 6 Anyone opening
an account in either of these two havens must have confidence that in the
ordinary course of business, the records of his account will be kept and
processed entirely at a local level.87 As stated by the Hong Kong Court
of Appeal in F.D.C. Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank-
There is no reason for [a customer] to suspect that the extent of such
confidentiality might vary from bank to bank depending on where its
head office is located. What we are concerned with here is not...
the relationship between a foreign bank operating in Hong Kong and
79. See Pitt et al., supra note 28, at 408.
80. Bank and Trust Companies Regulations Act, 1965, s. 10 (amended 1980) (Bah.).
81. See supra parts IE, II.F.
82. Civ. No. 852 (1986) (unreported) (Bah.) (copy on file with author).
83. Civ. No. 923 (1993) (unreported) (Bab.) (copy on file with author).
84. [1990] 1 H.K.L.R. 283 (H.K. Ct. App. 1990) (H.K.).
85. [19811 73 CR. APP. R 302 (Eng.).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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its customer. The relationship under consideration is between a bank
registered in Hong Kong and a customer in Hong Kong, their
relationship being governed by Hong Kong Law.8
Similarly, in Re Bank ofAmerica, Chief Justice Gonsalves-Sabola noted:
"I can find no warrant for regarding compulsion of law in the alien [U.S.]
jurisdiction of the Head Office as being comprehended in the compulsion
of law which Tournier recognised as constituting an exception to the duty
of confidentiality owed by a local [Bahamas] bank to its customer.
89
In practical terms, disclosure under compulsion by law often entails
disclosure through compulsion by statute. In England, the Jack
Committee Report" identified nineteen statutory provisions that permit
the disclosure of confidential bank account information without the
consent of the customer. Of immediate relevance is section 177 of the
Financial Services Act of 1986.9' Under this provision, the Secretary
of State can instruct inspectors to investigate whether a contravention of
the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act of 19859 has occurred.
Notwithstanding the common law duty of confidentiality, the Act
specifically vests the Secretary of State with the power to compel a bank
to disclose customer information. 93
No similar statutory provision exists in the Bahamas. It is suggested,
however, that the U.S. Justice Department could make use of a
combination of treaty and statutory provisions to compel Bahamian
bankers to disclose account information. In 1987, under the Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty94 [hereinafter MLAT], the United States and the
Bahamas agreed to assist one another in the investigation, prosecution,
and suppression of certain offenses. 9 Conduct punishable as a crime
88. [1990] 1 H.K.L.R. 283, 286 (H.K. Ct. App. 1990) (H.K.).
89. Civ. No. 923 (1993) (unreported) (Bah.) (copy on file with author).
90. The Jack Committee, a parliamentary committee, recommended the update and statutory
codification of the Tournier exceptions to the banker's duty of confidentiality, and the establishment
of a standard of best practice among banks clearly explaining the rules of this duty to customers.
The Report concluded with an "earnest appeal" for no further statutory exceptions to this duty, which
it viewed as a pillar of the banking system's integrity. See THE REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE
ON BANKING SERVICES: LAW AND PRACTICE 1992, CMND. 622 (1992).
91. See Financial Services Act, 1986, s. 177(8)(b) (Eng.).
92. Company Securities Act (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985 (Eng.).
93. Financial Services Act, 1986, s. 177(8)(b) (Eng.).
94. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Bahamas on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Feb. 4, 1988, U.S.-Bah., S. TREATY DOc. 100-17, 100th
Cong. (1989) [hereinafter MLAT]. In August 1990, The Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters)
Act 1988 came into operation in the Bahamas. The Act had the effect of domesticating the 1987
treaty so that the treaty became part of the municipal law of the Bahamas and directly applicable in
Bahamian courts.
95. MLAT, supra note 94, art. I(l).
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under the laws of both countries qualifies as an offense under the
MLAT.96
Insider trading is a crime in the United States97 and has been a
crime in the Bahamas since June 1992. 9' Once the element of dual
criminality has been established, the Attorney-General of the Bahamas99
can initiate assistance, including, among other things: (1) taking the
testimony of persons; 0 (2) providing documents;'0 ' (3) serving
documents; 0 2 and (4) exchanging information in relation to the
investigation prosecution and suppression. of offenses. 3 The treaty
further stipulates that all requests for information must comply with the
domestic laws of the solicited state.'04 Notwithstanding the Bahamian
statutory and common law duties of bank secrecy, the Attorney-General
could, under the Tournier qualification of disclosure by compulsion of
law, make an application to the court citing the Bank Act.0 5
It must be noted that this proposal is, at best, tentative. First, under
article 3(1)(a) of the MLAT, the Bahamas may deny a request to the
extent that the request would prejudice its essential public interests. 6
Arguably, the Bahamas view bank secrecy as tantamount to economic
development and any weakening of it threatens "essential public interest."
Second, the preamble of the MLAT states that:
The Government of the United States of America and The
government of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas, Desiring to
provide more effective cooperation between the two States in the
investigation, prosecution, and suppression of serious crimes
[emphasis added], such as narcotics trafficking; and Desiring to
96. Id. art. 2(l)(a).
97. Willful violations of the securities laws or the rules promulgated under them are prohibited
by fines and imprisonment.
98. Section 302(1) of the Bahamian Companies Act provides:
A person being an insider who ... makes use of any material confidential information
for his own benefit or advantage shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable on
conviction on information to a fine of fifty thousand dollars or to imprisonment for two
years or to both such fine and imprisonment.
Companies Act, 1992, s. 302(1) (Bah.).
99. MLAT, supra note 94, art. 4(3).
100. Id. art. 1(2)(a).
101. Id. art. 2(b).
102. Id. art. 1(2)(c).
103. Id. art. 1(2)(g).
104. MLAT, supra note 94, art. 1(4).
105. See Banks and Trust Companies Regulations Act, 1965, s. 10(l)(e)(iii) (amended 1980
(Bah.).
106. MLAT, supra note 94, art. 3(l)(a).
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improve coordination and mutual assistance in law enforcement
matters in general; have agreed as follows...'OT
Indeed, there are a multiplicity of factors that could arise which
negate the use of the MLAT for insider trading applications. Any further
discussion of the mechanics of the MLAT are, however, outside the scope
of the present analysis. It is sufficient to note that legal creativity is
essential to successful investigations into transborder securities fraud."' 8
One instance of legal creativity that reaped reward for the SEC was
the litigation involving Dennis Levine. 1°9 The unique approach in the
Levine case developed from previous unsuccessful attempts to obtain
client information. The Re Guaranty Trust Co." case illustrates such
a failed attempt. In Re Guaranty Trust Co., the SEC argued before the
Bahamian courts that securities transactions were not equivalent to
banking transactions."' It followed that Bahamian bank secrecy laws
would not be breached if the client's name was revealed." 2 Before this
line of reasoning could be evaluated, the Court of Appeal dismissed the
case on the basis that the SEC lacked standing to seek a declaratory
judgment." 3
Having learned the error of its ways in Guaranty Trust, the SEC
adopted a different approach in the Levine investigation. Here, the SEC
directly approached the Attorney-General of the Bahamas for
assistance." 4 Again, the SEC lawyers contended that disclosure of
Levine's name would not violate Bahamian secrecy laws, given that it
was a "securities" transaction rather than a "banking" transaction." 5
This time, however, the Attorney-General condoned what no Bahamian
court would. It is suggested that Bahamian compliance with the SEC's
request for information in the Levine investigation was unorthodox and
is unlikely to be repeated. This conclusion is based on the fact that
107. Id. pmbl. Perhaps insider trading is not a serious crime at all and would not fall within the
treaty. See BARRY RIDER & T.M. ASHE, INSIDER CRIME - THE NEW LAW v (1993) ("Contrary to
what some people may think ... we do not consider insider dealing as the most serious of the 'white
collar' offences, let alone criminal offences."); H. MANNE, INSIDER DEALING AND THE STOCK
MARKET 131-45 (1966).
108. S. Cass Weiland, The Use of Offshore Institutions to Facilitate Criminal Activity in the
United States, 16 N.Y.U. 1. INT'L L. & POL. 1115 (1984).
109. See supra part 1.




114. SEC v. Levine, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92717 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd and remanded
on other grounds, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989).
115. See id.
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shortly after the Attorney-General's ruling, the Bahamian government
publicly announced that (1) the ruling turned on its own special facts; and
(2) notwithstanding any implication to the contrary, the government was
committed to the preservation of bank-related information." 6
2. Disclosure Under Public Duty.-In Tournier, Lord Justice
Bankes summarized the disclosure under the public duty exception with
reference to Lord Finlay's judgment in Weld-Blundell v. Stephens."7
In Weld-Blundell, Lord Finlay spoke of cases where a higher duty than
private duty is involved, as where danger to the state may supersede the
duty of the agent to his principal."' Construed broadly, this exception
could include disclosing information that helps alleviate fraud on
securities markets. Once again, however, it is important to note that this
qualification is only an exception to the duty of secrecy where the
disclosure is owed to the public of the Bahamas. It is submitted that
foreign court proceedings do not fall within this qualification.
3. Disclosure Under Bank Duty.-The interests of the bank require
some disclosure of the customer's transactions whenever there is litigation
between the bank and its customer. In Bahamian jurisprudence,
conflicting authority exists as to whether a Bahamian bank can reveal
information to a foreign court when served with a subpoena duces tecum.
This notion has been reflected in two recent cases. First, in Re Standard
Chartered Bank,119 the appellant bank was incorporated under the laws
of England with a branch network throughout the world. Branch
locations specifically included Nassau and New York. 20 Three of the
bank's customers were under investigation for tax fraud and thus, the
New York branch was served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring the
production of confidential bank documents located in the Bahamas. 1 '
The bank applied for a declaration that it be at liberty to produce
subpoenaed records before the grand jury.'22 The Bahamian Court
refused the declaration sought and rejected the proposition that the
inteiest of the bank in disclosing information to the New York Grand
Jury in compliance with a subpoena directed to it, operated as an
116. GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS STATEMENT (Sept. 4, 1986).
117. 1920 A.C. 956, 965 (Eng.).
118. [1924] 1 K.B. 473 (Eng.).




SECURITIES LAWS IN HAVEN JURISDICTIONS
exception to the prohibition contained in section 10(1) of the Bank
Act. 123
Contrary authority, however, is provided by Royal Bank of Canada
v. Apollo Development Ltd.124 In that case, a subpoena duces tecum
was served on the plaintiff in New York requiring the production of
confidential bank documents located at its Bahamian branch. 25  The
court held that the interest of the bank in disclosing such documents in
answer to the subpoena was sufficient to constitute an exception to the
prohibition otherwise provided by section 10(1) of the Bank Act. 126
Although these judgments represent a divergence of approach, it is
more likely that Re Standard Chartered Bank is the preferred approach,
as it represents the most recent approach of the Bahamian Supreme Court
in Re Bank of America. 27 In Re Bank of America, the applicant's head
office was in the United States, with local branches in the Bahamas.
2
1
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served U.S. federal district court
orders on the head office to produce bank records of customers at the
Nassau branch. 29  Not wanting to violate either the U.S. court
summons or the bank secrecy laws of the Bahamas, Bank America and
its subsidiary, Bahamas Trust, joined to seek a declaration from the
Supreme Court of the Bahamas that they would be able to comply with
the IRS summons. 30  The Court returned a wholesale refusal of the
bank's application.'
3'
In refusing the application, Chief Justice Gonsalves-Sabola
respectfully criticized the reasoning in The Royal Bank of Canada case.
He stated that it either was a case that turned on its own facts or that
Chief Justice Georges decided the case without considering Lord Justice
Atkins's judgment in Tournier:
It is difficult to hit upon a formula which will define the maximum
of the obligation which must necessarily be implied. But I think it is
safe to say that the obligation not to disclose information such as I
have mentioned is subject to the qualification that the bank have the
right to disclose such information when, and to the extent to which it
is reasonably necessary for the protection of the bank's interests,
123. Id. See supra part II.E.
124. 1985 L.R.C. (Comm.) 66 (Bah.).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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either as against their customer or as against third parties in respect
of transactions of the bank for or with their customer, or for
protecting the bank or persons interested or the public against fraud
or crime.'32
In Gonsalves-Sabola's estimation, disclosure by the bank to save itself
from the threatening behavior of third persons who are entirely outside
the privity of the contract with the bank's customers, falls outside any of
the Tournier categories. Accordingly, as a matter of contract law, the
bank could not assert any legal right vis-a-vis the customer, to make
disclosure to a third party. 33 Portions of Gonsalves-Sabola's judgment
provide further elucidation:
Since the relationship between a bank and its customer is born out of
contract and governed throughout by that law or principle, if a bank
and its customer did not expressly or implicitly contract out of their
reciprocal common law duties, the bank cannot unilaterally relieve
itself of that most sensitive of its contractual obligations - non-
disclosure without the customer's consent - for reasons not sounding
in the law of contract. If the banker needed to secure for himself the
liberty to disclose his customer's affairs under compulsion of foreign
law he could have procured that inclusion of a term to that effect in
the contract. Subsequent events which show that the banker may have
benefitted from the inclusion of suitably protective terms in the
contract do not justify a court coming to the banker's protection in
order to save him from his own lack of foresight and to the prejudice
of his customer's rights.'34
Two final cases further enhance the Re Bank of America position of
nondisclosure for foreign sovereigns. First, in XA.G. v. A Bank,35 the
English judiciary demonstrated that national interest will take precedence
over the policies of the United States. In XA.G., a group of oil
companies maintained an account at the London branch of Citibank, a
U.S. bank.'36 The group's U.S. subsidiary had dealings in the U.S. oil
markets.'37 In an investigation into the crude oil business, the U.S.
Justice Department sought information concerning all the companies in
the group.'38 Accordingly, the Justice Department served a subpoena
on Citibank's U.S. office to produce documents located at its London
132. Civ. No. 923 (1993) (unreported) (Bah.) (copy on file with author).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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branch. 39 When the bank made it clear that it intended to provide the
documents, the group obtained an interim injunction in the High
Court. 40  When the U.S. District Court issued another order
commanding disclosure, Mr. Justice Legatt continued the injunction.'
4'
Consistent with the views expressed by Mr. Justice of Appeals Yang in
F.D.C. Co. and Chief Justice Gonsalves-Sabola in Re Bank of America,
Mr. Justice Legatt made it clear that the group of companies opened their
account in London and could expect that the proper law of the contract
was. English law.' 42  Moreover, disclosure by the bank would not be
justified on the ground that it had to comply with the subpoena of a U.S.
Court. 1
43
Second, in F.D.C. Co., the Hong Kong Court of Appeal affirmed an
injunction to constrain the defendants from complying with a U.S.
subpoena to supply local Hong Kong bank account information to U.S.
revenue- authorities. 44 Here again, the plaintiffs, who maintained an
account with the Hong Kong branch of Chase instituted local proceedings
to enjoin the bank from releasing documents pursuant to a U.S.
subpoena.145 Again the court continued the injunction stating that the
duty of secrecy was not constrained by territorial limits. 146 Although
the orders of the U.S. court were addressed to Chase at its New York
offices, they were "aimed unashamedly"' 147 at information that was
within the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts and they were therefore
intended to have extraterritorial effect. As stated by V.P. Huggins:
The Hong Kong Courts could enjoin the Bank against disclosing the
information to the US Government in Hong Kong and I am satisfied
that they can restrain a transfer which is nothing more nor less than
a device to avoid the enforcement in Hong Kong of the orders of a
foreign court .... [W]e are not bound to hold back from enforcing
the law of Hong Kong at the dictate of a foreign power .... All
persons opening accounts with banks in Hong Kong, whether foreign
or local banks, are entitled to look to the Hong Kong Courts to
enforce any obligation of secrecy which, by the law of Hopg Kong,
is implied by virtue of the relationship of banker and customer.
48
139. Id.




144. 1 H.K.L.R. 283 (1990) (H.K. Ct. App. 1990) (H.K.).
145. ld.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 278.
148. Id. at 284.
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All these cases demonstrate that English, Hong Kong, and Bahamian
courts are keen to protect the secrecy laws. There is consistency in the
application of the Tournier qualifications and the reasoning of the variety
of judges. Haven courts that are governed by the common law will resist
attempts by the United States to infringe upon respective jurisdictions'
bank secrecy laws. Therefore, it is unlikely that a bank employee, served
with a subpoena duces tucem, would be entitled to disclose information
otherwise required to be held confidentially.
4. Disclosure Under Express or Implied Consent of the
Customer.-In this analysis, it is assumed that under the fourth exception,
a banker could not obtain the express consent of a customer to disclose
information to securities regulators. Indeed, it is rare for the suspected
offender to knowingly relinquish incriminating evidence. Consensual
access can be acquired, however, from the bank account holder who fears
no punishment for any wrongdoing.'49 A frequent example of implied
consent is where the customer authorizes a reference to his banker.
Nothing in the Bank Act can prevent a bank from providing information
on a customer's general credit rating upon a legitimate request in the
normal course of business. 5 ' This disclosure provision, however, is of
little use to the securities regulator.
In Re ABC Ltd.,' 5 the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands
evaluated the position of a Cayman Island bank that had been served with
a consent signed by a client in accordance with a U.S. court order. The
bank applied for a direction under the Confidential Relations
(Preservation) Law of 1976152 as to whether it should act on the consent
it had received, and Chief Justice Summerfield held that it should not,
stating that:
Although in form the consent directive purports to be a consent and
direction given by the client of the bank, it is in substance a direction
given by the foreign court. It is not a real consent at all. In reality
it is the foreign court directing the bank to disclose confidential
information." 3
The significance of this decision to offshore jurisprudence is its
suggestion that although Tournier contemplates an express or implied
149. Bradley 0. Field, Improving International Evidence Gathering Methods, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L
& COMp. L.J. 691, 698 (1993).
150. Bank and Trust Companies Regulations Act, 1965, s. 10(2) (amended 1980) (Bah.).
151. 1985 F.L.R. 159 (Cayman Islands).
152. Confidential Relations (Preservation) Law, 1976 (Cayman Islands).
153. 1985 F.L.R. 159, 163 (Cayman Islands).
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waiver, a court must be satisfied that the waiver was voluntarily given.
A foreign court's order of "compelled consent" is an oxymoron that
cannot force disclosure.
H. Summary
The cases cited on bank secrecy demonstrate that a principal interest
of the courts involved was to preserve the confidential relationship
between banker and customer. The sanctity of this relationship was
upheld both to maintain the sovereignty of the haven and to engender
economic sustenance. Indeed, bank secrecy laws embody important
national interests arising from circumstances wholly apart from securities
regulation. Despite these valid goals, bank secrecy laws provide undue
protection to those persons committing fraud on U.S. markets.'54 The
SEC believes that bank secrecy laws have a broad capacity to impede
investigations of a variety of securities violations, including: (1)
acquisitions of securities in violation of beneficial ownership and tender
offer provisions of the Exchange Act; (2) stock manipulations; (3)
violations of margin requirements; (4) misappropriation of corporate
assets; and (5) laundering of funds generated by illegal activities.'55
Indeed, the Tournier rules remain law. It is time, however, to reassess
these rules in light of the requirements of modem transnational
commerce. World trade based on free markets demands the strict
regulation of market participants. As bank secrecy is incompatible with




While the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has an
enviable record of policing transactions domestically, its current tools are
too unwieldy and time-consuming to deal effectively with haven
jurisdictions. According to one former SEC Commissioner, prevailing
methods of investigating foreign initiated transactions are ". . . slow,
cumbersome, unpredictable and often unproductive."' 56  The purpose
154. See, e.g., J. Fedders, Policing Trans-Border Fraud in the United States Securities Markets:
The Waiver by Conduct Concept - A Possible Alternative or Starting Point for Discussion, 11
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 480 (1985).
155. EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE No. 21186 (July 30, 1984), reprinted in [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,980.
156. See Fedders, supra note 154, at 480.
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of this part is to evaluate the SEC's use of litigation to obtain requested
information. For the sake of clarity, Part III is divided into six
substantive subparts. Subpart B initiates the discussion with a summary
of the goals of the SEC's enforcement program. Taking into account
these goals, Subpart C explains how the enforcement program is
obstructed by bank secrecy laws. Subparts D and E evaluate the methods
by which U.S. courts assert jurisdiction over offshore initiated
transactions. Finally, through an analysis of three of the leading U.S.
cases involving bank secrecy laws, Subpart F assesses the SEC's success
with litigation.
B. Goals of Regulation
The primary objective of the SEC's enforcement program is to
preserve investor confidence in the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of
the securities market.' To further this objective, the Commission, in
recent years, has focused attention on a number of problem areas. One
of the most prominent areas of focus has been insider trading.
The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws aim to (1)
maintain the integrity of the securities market; and (2) guarantee that
people trading in securities will not be disadvantaged by insiders or those
who misuse their access to material nonpublic corporate information. 5
If the SEC fails to pursue aggressive policing of these markets, investors
essentially accept a double standard of law enforcement, one standard for
individuals who trade from within the United States and a second
standard for individuals trading outside the United States. Offshore
investors cannot be allowed to contravene U.S. laws with impunity, while
domestic investors are accountable for the same violations.15 9
Although two schools of thought reach opposing conclusions as to
whether insider trading should be prohibited, an evaluation of this debate
is superfluous here. For present purposes, it is accepted that the practice
of insider trading must be banned.6 Sufficient concern has been
157. Sandra N. Hurd, Insider Trading and Foreign Bank Secrecy, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 25, 26
(1986).
158. W. McLucas et al., Protection from International Fraud - Legal and Enforcement
Developments: Part , 13 COMPANY LAW. 206-07 (1992).
159. Fedders, supra note 154, at 488.
160. On numerous occasions, courts have found that insider trading is simply dishonest. See
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("Chiarella ... misappropriated - stole to put it bluntly - valuable nonpublic information entrusted
to him in the utmost confidence ... [and] then exploited his ill-gotten informational advantage by
purchasing securities in the market."). See also SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 599 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), modified 638 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("case reveals a crass abuse and betrayal of a
personal and professional relationship of trust and confidence for personal gain").
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expressed that securities markets could suffer harm if public confidence
in their fairness were eroded, as investors may be deterred from
participating in the market if they know that others are trading on
information legally prohibited from the investing public.
C. How Enforcement Activities are Impeded by Bank Secrecy Laws
Domestically, the SEC's enforcement objectives have been achieved
through its statutory ability to conduct investigations into alleged
securities violations. Under express provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act, the SEC is entitled to obtain full and complete trading records from
any broker or dealer located within the United States or transacting
business in securities through a registered broker or dealer.' 6 ' This
information necessarily includes the identity of any customers of the
broker on whose behalf the suspicious trades were executed, the amounts
of stock purchased and the time of the transactions.
When attempting to gather information located in haven
jurisdictions, the SEC frequently encounters barriers in the form of local
nondisclosure laws. These obstacles vary depending on the country.
Often, the prohibitions are in the form of statutes or as judicially-
constructed nondisclosure principles. The Bahamas case study was
illustrative of the prohibitions invoked by offshore banks when SEC
requests for information are received.
The internationalization of securities markets and corresponding
increase in haven initiated transactions challenges the existing
enforcement structure. The regulations described above were designed
to maintain the integrity of national markets. Domestically-oriented
regulations, however, are proving ineffective in the face of securities
transactions originating in bank secrecy jurisdictions.
D. Litigation
Indeed, the SEC can avail itself of numerous statutory and treaty-
based mechanisms to extract information shielded by bank secrecy
laws.'6 2 A wholesale evaluation of these mechanisms, however, is
outside the scope of the current analysis. Given that most attempts by the
SEC to obtain information located in haven jurisdictions have resulted in
161. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-80c-3 (1988).
162. Other methods include (1) through informal cooperation between regulators, as demonstrated
by the time the SEC notified United Kingdom authorities about the Guinness Affair and (2) through
bilateral and multilateral agreements, for example, the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. See L. GOWER, BIG BANG AND CITY REGULATION (1988).
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litigation, it will be the primary focus here. 6 3  Notwithstanding its
shortcomings, litigation has been a useful tool in effecting changes in
how countries with nondisclosure laws address SEC requests for
information.
If sufficient information obtained during the SEC's initial inquiry
indicates that a violation of the federal securities laws has occurred, the
SEC can initiate an action in federal court.
E. Jurisdiction
The following two jurisdictional thresholds must be satisfied before
a U.S. court will adjudicate a dispute involving the extraterritorial
application of securities laws: (1) subject matter jurisdiction; and
(2) personal jurisdiction.'64 The following two subsections confirm that
haven banks that trade on U.S. securities markets are within the ambit of
the U.S. judicial process.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.-U.S. jurisprudence has well-
established that the courts have subject matter jurisdiction over securities
purchases initiated offshore and executed on U.S. markets. 65  From the
U.S. perspective, asserting jurisdiction over a foreign country's territory
can be substantiated on the basis of both the conduct and effects doctrines
of prescriptive jurisdiction under international law.' 66 Under the former
doctrine, the United States can attach legal consequences to conduct that
occurs within its territory.167  Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon)
S.A.L.168 held that the execution of trades on U.S. markets constitutes
sufficient conduct to come within the scope of U.S. securities laws.
Accordingly, where a haven bank initiates securities transactions on a
U.S. market, it will be within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
Under the effects doctrine, it is permissible to apply U.S. law if
conduct beyond its territorial limits has a substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect within the United States. 69  Arguably, initiating
163. R. Ferrara & J. Mackintosh, Legal Representation and the International Securities Market,
10 COMPANY LAW. 103 (1989). Given the SEC's access to litigation, these authors argue that the
primary concern of the practitioner must be the ability to settle claims prior to a courtroom visit.
164. Edward F. Greene et al., Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market,
9 UNIV. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 325, 343 (1987).
165. Derek J.T. Adler & Marco E. Schnabl, Reaffirmation ofAvailability ofAntifraud Provisions
of U.S. Securities Law to Foreign Litigants Suing in U.S. Courts, 20 INT'L Bus. LAW. 29, 30 (1992).
166. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (discussing the effects doctrine).
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
(1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
168. 730 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1984).
169. RESTATEMENT, supra note 167, § 18.
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insider trades offshore encourages such an effect. As the Court in Tamari
noted:
[w]hen transactions initiated by agents abroad involve trading on
United States exchanges, the pricing and hedging functions of the
domestic markets are directly implicated, just as they would be by an
entirely domestic transaction. If the transactions are the result of
fraudulent representations, unauthorized trading, or mismanagement
of trading accounts, prices and trading volumes in the domestic
marketplace will be financially influenced and public confidence could
be undermined. 7°
2. Personal Jurisdiction.-Personal jurisdiction entails the ability of
a court to effect service of notice on a party. It is usually based on a
finding that a party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum.
This notion of sufficient minimum contact is complemented by the due
process requirement that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" 7' be satisfied. In effect, where a haven bank is part of a
multinational institution with offices in the United States, the haven bank
will be within the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The fact that
documents identifying the beneficiary of a bank account are outside the
territorial boundaries of the United States does not impede the service of
process. For example, the New York office of a bank can be compelled
to produce documents located in Nassau. In Re Marc Rich,'72 the court
stated that "the witness [may not] resist the production of documents on
the grounds that the documents are located abroad .... The test for the
production of documents is control, not location.' 73
Even in the unlikely situation that a haven bank exists independently
of any branch network, the bank will still be within the personal
jurisdiction of U.S. courts if it executes transactions on U.S. markets.
According to one former SEC commissioner, "the cases go very far in
subjecting anyone who effects transactions in US securities directly or
indirectly through a US financial institution to the [personal] jurisdiction
of a US court.' 74 In SEC v. Tome, 175 for example, the Commission
received the court's approval to serve process through newspaper
advertisements in several European cities. This was an insider trading
170. Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108.
171. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
172. 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983).
173. Id. at 667.
174. R.I. Karnel, The Second Circuit's Role in Expanding the SEC's Jurisdiction Abroad, 65
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 765 (1991).
175. 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014, 1015 (1988).
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case, based on circumstantial evidence, where the identity of the
fraudulent dealers was unknown. The SEC exercised similar creativity
in another insider trading case, SEC v. Unifund S.A.L.' 76  Here, the
service of process was initially delivered by overnight courier to the New
York office of the broker who executed the stock purchase with
instructions to forward the papers to Unifund in Beirut.' Again, the
court ruled that service was effective.' 78
Thus, jurisdiction over securities transactions initiated offshore gives
the SEC settled ability to make use of the U.S. judicial system.
F. Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Once an action has been filed and the court's jurisdiction has been
verified, the SEC may start discovery procedures under the United States'
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter FRCP]. If a court subpoena
has been effectively served and the recipient bank does not comply, the
SEC can request the court to issue an order compelling discovery under
Rule 37 of the FRCP. 7 9 If the bank fails to comply with this court
order, Rule 37 gives the court the power to impose sanctions against the
bank, including contempt proceedings, monetary fines and other adverse
measures. 1
80
Despite the existence of wide subject matter and personal
jurisdiction, U.S. courts nevertheless exercise perfunctory discretion when
encroaching on the sovereignty of other jurisdictions and occasionally
refrain from doing so. The three cases discussed below examine the
methods by which U.S. courts resolve the conflict of laws in the absence
of information sharing agreements on insider trading. U.S. courts dealing
with the problem of exercising the right to enforce U.S. laws
extraterritorially have usually applied one or more of three tests:
(1) international comity; 8 ' (2) balancing of interests; 82 and (3) good
faith.8 3  These tests will be assessed in more detail within the
framework created by the three cases.
176. 910 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1990), petition for reh'g denied, 917 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1990).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. FED. R. CIV. P. 37. See also J. Fedders, Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets:
Methods to Obtain Evidence Abroad, 18 INT'L L. 96-97 (1984).
180. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 37. See also Martin Radvan, The Hague Convention on Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: Several Notes Concerning its Scope, Methods,
and Compulsion, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1031 (1984).
181. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera
Intaliana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
182. RESTATEMENT, supra note 167, § 40.
183. Socidtd Intemationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1958).
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1. The St. Joe Case.-SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana'84
[hereinafter St. Joe Case], involved an attempt by the SEC to obtain
information protected by Swiss bank secrecy laws. BSI was a Swiss
bank that maintained a subsidiary in the United States.185 The SEC
alleged that BSI and its principals had traded on inside information.'86
During the course of its investigation, the SEC requested the identity of
individuals who had conducted certain securities transactions through
BSI."5 7 BSI argued that under Swiss law, it would be unable to
identify such customers because it was shielded by bank secrecy law. 8'
Following BSI's refusal to divulge such information, a New York
District Court granted the SEC's application for a temporary restraining
order to freeze BSI's New York bank account.'89 More significantly,
the District Court ordered BSI to comply fully with the SEC's request for
information.'9" BSI subsequently obtained a waiver from its customers
and satisfied the SEC's request. 19' What is of interest is the approach
of the U.S. court in determining that BSI should comply with the SEC
request, obliquely requiring BSI to breach Swiss secrecy laws.
The issue of comity was not addressed by the St. Joe court. This is
a departure from the earlier approach of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. 92 Previous judgments stressed that production of
requested information would not be required if such production would
disturb the relationships enjoyed with a neighboring state. This course
of action was supported by the belief that diplomatic channels were best
suited for such endeavors. The situation today, however, differs
markedly. Courts continue to recognize the legitimate interests of haven
jurisdictions, but it is almost unheard of to defer on the basis of
international comity. According to Harvey Pitt, former General Counsel
to the SEC, two elements chronicle the demise of the international comity
test: (1) It fails to recognize any interest the United States might have in
the outcome other than maintaining good relations in the international
theater; and (2) It provides haven jurisdictions with an incentive to retain





189. St. Joe Case, 92 F.R.D. at 113; D. Newcomb, Policing Trans-Border Fraud, 11 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 562 (1985).
190. St. Joe Case, 92 F.R.D. at 113.
191. Id. at 113.
192. See, e.g., Re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v. Ferguson, 282
F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959).
13 DICK. J. INT'L L. SPRING 1995
virile bank secrecy laws secure in the knowledge that the United States
will defer to their legislation.
9 3
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit'94 jettisoned the
comity standard with its 1968 adoption of the American Law Institute's
balancing of interests test. This test evolved into the principal judicial
instrument by which the -competing interests would be assessed. The
balancing test entails numerous criteria. Principal among them are:
(1) the vital national interests of each of the states; and (2) the extent and
the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose.' 9'
In the present case, the court concluded that the United States had
a vital national interest in maintaining the integrity of its securities
markets. Haven-initiated transactions threatened the strength of U.S.
markets and affected U.S. economic interests.
96
District Judge Pollack then considered the second factor in the
balancing of interests test, namely the extent of the hardship that
inconsistent enforcement actions would impose on BSI. While conceding
that BSI could be subject to monetary and criminal penalties under Swiss
law, Judge Pollack determined that that same Swiss law contained a
"state of necessity" exception that operated to relieve an individual of
criminal liability in these circumstances.197
The court further considered whether BSI approached the
proceedings in good faith. From the Supreme Court judgment in Socigtg
Internationale v. Rogers98 the Court elicited that if a party acted in
good faith but was unable to comply because of foreign law, it was
possible for the party to avoid sanctions being imposed for non-
compliance. In Socijtk Internationale, the Court articulated a two-step
test for deciding if the party in question acted in good faith. First, the
party must make efforts "to the maximum of its ability" to achieve
compliance. Second, the party must not "deliberately court legal
impediments."' 99  The significance of this test, however, must be
questioned. Subsequent cases in the federal appellate courts generally
193. Pitt et al., supra note 28, at 419.
194. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has had and continues to have a profound effect on
securities law. It is known as the "mother court." Its judgments bind the courts in the southern
district of New York within the scope of New York's financial center. R. Karmel, The Second
Circuit's Role in Expanding the SEC's Jurisdiction Abroad, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 743 (1991).
195. See, e.g., Garpeg Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789, 795 (2d Cir. 1984).
196. See St. Joe Case, 92 F.R.D. at 117-18.
197. Id. at 118-19.
198. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
199. Id. at 208-09, 211-12.
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imposed sanctions for non-compliance with subpoenas and narrowly
construed the holding decided in Socitd Internationale.2 °°
Here, the court determined that the Bank failed to bring itself within
the ambit of Socigtj Internationale.20 ' The Bank had not pursued good
faith efforts to comply with the SEC subpoena.2 °2 BSI was found to
have deliberately taken advantage of Swiss bank secrecy laws in an effort
to eschew U.S. securities regulations.2 °3 Moreover, BSI had profited
from its conduct. 24 The court asserted that:
It would be a travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to
invade American markets, violate American laws if they were indeed
violated, withdraw profits and resist accountability for itself and its
principals for the illegality by claiming their anonymity under foreign
law.
20 5
The approach of the St. Joe court illustrates the conflict between the
good faith standard and the primary interests of the United States in
discovery. While U.S. courts will consider factors such as international
comity in jurisdictional disputes, the tendency, as represented by this
case, is to find that U.S. interests supersede all other nations' interests.
The preponderance of U.S. case law concludes that in the interests of
international comity, it is best if the United States' needs are satisfied
first.206 Indeed, the good faith test is "intended to do justice in the
individual situation and to provide a less offensive approach from the
international perspective.""2 7  Contemporary judgments indicate,
however, that a party basing its conduct on a foreign secrecy law will
inevitably be at odds with U.S. law and therefore act in bad faith.
Predictably, such an approach diminishes principles of international
comity.
In a broader context, the St. Joe case illustrates how the threat of
sanctions and court orders compelling compliance with SEC
investigations can be successful. Nevertheless, litigation is a questionable
200. See, e.g., United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981); Civil Aeronautics v.
Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschat 591 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Ohio v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978).




205. Id. at 119.
206. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2nd Cir. 1986); In re Chase
Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962); First Nat'l Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959).
207. Strict Enforcement of Extraterritorial Discovery, 38 STANFoRD L. REv. 871 (1986).
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long term solution to the SEC's international problems for three
reasons. 208  First, litigation is an inherently ad hoc approach for
resolving barriers created by bank secrecy laws. Inconsistent results and
increasing volumes of litigation mandate an approach which guarantees
greater uniformity. A case-by-case method for analyzing whether
production of information will be compelled does not provide the most
effective deterrent against securities law violators.20 9 Second, obtaining
a Rule 37 court order is difficult, as the case must be pending before a
U.S. District Court. As a result, for the SEC investigation to proceed to
this stage, the SEC must engage in time-consuming and costly litigation.
Moreover, there is an opportunity cost in that other, possibly more
important, enforcement activities are forsaken. Third, litigation creates
friction between states. Ultimately, this could impair U.S. foreign
relations, as well as damage other investigations.
2. The Bank of Nova Scotia Case.-United States v. Bank of Nova
Scotia2"' is relevant for its insight into litigation's costly effect on the
financial intermediary. First, however, it is necessary to assess the
mechanics of the court's judgment.
In this case, the Bank of Nova Scotia, a Canadian bank, maintained
branches in approximately forty-five countries, including the United
States and the Bahamas.2 ' A customer of the Bahamas branch was
being tried in the United States for tax and narcotics violations.
1 2
During the trial, the U.S. court issued a subpoena duces tecum requesting
information on transactions initiated by the customer.213 When the
Bank refused to comply, citing Bahamian bank secrecy law, the court
found the Bank in contempt, noting that a mere assertion of illegality
would be insufficient to evade sanctions.21 4
The Bank asserted, among other things, that comity between
countries precluded the enforcement of the subpoena.2 '5 Specifically,
the Bank argued that the U.S. government "could avoid rather than
provoke disrespect for the sovereignty of a friendly nation" by pursuing
208. R. Kauffman, Secrecy and Blocking Laws: A Growing Problem as the Internationalization
of Securities Markets Continues, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 831-33 (1985).
209. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, CRIME AND SECREcY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES
325 (1983).
210. 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982).
211. Id. at 1386.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1387.
215. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1389-91.
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the alternative of applying for an order of judicial assistance permitting
disclosure from the Supreme Court of the Bahamas." 6 The court
rejected this argument, and under the rubric of comity,2"7 contended
that the judicial assistance procedure would not provide due deference to
the interests of the United States.2"'
The U.S. court conceded that enforcement of such a subpoena could
potentially result in a deterioration of relations between the two countries.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that:
While it is true courts should not impinge upon the political
prerogatives of the government in the sensitive area of foreign
relations (Chicago and Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship
Corp.), accepting the Bank's position would be a greater interference
with foreign relations than the procedures employed here. In essence,
the Bank would require the government to choose between impeding
the grand jury's investigation and petitioning the Supreme Court of
the Bahamas for an order of disclosure." 9
The court further considered whether the Bank approached the
proceedings in good faith. Briefly, the court asserted that the Bank failed
to bring itself within the ambit of Sociitd Iternationale.220  The Bank
had not pursued good faith efforts to comply with the SEC subpoena.22" '
As a consequence of the Bank's failure to release customer information,
civil contempt sanctions were imposed. 2  By the time the Bank
completely complied with the subpoena to produce offshore documents,
its $25,000 per day fine totaled $1,825,o0.223
This case, like the St. Joe Case, exhibits that the SEC can achieve
results with litigation. Notwithstanding these pyrrhic victories, it is
submitted again that litigation remains an untenable long term solution.
216. Id. at 1390.
217. Although the court couched its reasoning under the rubric of comity, in fact, it is submitted,
they engaged in a balancing of interests test.
218. "In essence, the Bank asks the court to require our government to ask the courts of the
Bahamas to be allowed to do something lawful under US law. We conclude such a procedure to be
contrary to the interests of our nation and outweigh the interests of the Bahamas." Bank of Nova
Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1391.
219. Id. at 1388.
220. Id. at 1388-89.
221. Id. In later litigation on the same issue the same court held that "[t]he Bank had voluntarily
elected to do business in numerous foreign countries and has accepted the incidental risk of
occasional inconsistent governmental actions. It cannot expect to avail itself of the benefits of doing
business here without accepting the concomitant obligations." Re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of
Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11 th Cir. 1984).
222. Grand Jury Proceedings, 740 F.2d at 819.
223. Id. at 824.
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Elaborating on the shortcomings discussed above, this case demonstrates
the intolerable dilemma for third party multinational banks that hold
confidential information as fiduciaries for others.224 The frequency of
conflicting jurisdictional problems for the multinational bank only seems
to be increasing. The United States' resort to litigation, while satisfying
for short-term objectives, proves to be no more acceptable for either the
securities regulator or the financial institution. Confrontation between the
bank and securities regulator often results in the diversion of the
investigation, as resources are expended on the debate over disclosure
rather than on the primary objectives of the investigations.225 Further,
despite the drain on the bank's resources, the securities regulator
encounters an opponent willing and capable of bearing the costs involved
in such litigation.
In a wider context, Bank of Nova Scotia equally reveals that the
continued assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction serves to irritate
relationships with other countries. Both Canada and the Bahamas filed
amicus curiae briefs with the court to emphasize their dissatisfaction with
the U.S. approach. In effect, U.S. investigative efforts are capable of
alienating otherwise friendly nations. The attempt also weakens a critical
foundation of international law, namely, the sovereign equality of all
states. This principle of international law dictates that the conflicting
authorities of two sovereign states be given equal weight. It would seem
to follow that a private party should not be penalized for choosing to
obey one state at the other's expense. However, this is precisely what
happens to the multinational bank.
3. The Santa Fe Case.-This case may be distinguished from the
two cases above because in Sante Fe, an information sharing agreement,
while not specifically on insider trading, was tested. In the Santa Fe
case,226 the SEC brought civil proceedings in New York alleging that
insider trading had occurred prior to the takeover of Santa Fe by Kuwait
Petroleum. The SEC contended that Swiss banks with branch offices in
the United States had unknowingly acted as conduits through which the
prohibited trading had occurred.227 Accordingly, the SEC requested the
names of the banks' customers involved in the transactions in issue.228
224. Douglas E. Rosenthal & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALl Restatement's
Provisions on Foreign Discovery, 16 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL 1075, 1081 (1984).
225. Newcomb, supra note 189, at 564.
226. 23 I.L.M. 511 (1984).
227. See id.
228. In this case, the SEC was unaware of the identity of the purchaser for whom the Swiss bank
executed the transaction. Accordingly, it filed a "John Doe" complaint naming the "unknown
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The U.S. court granted the SEC's request for an order to produce the
relevant information.' Once again, the Swiss banks initially refused
to comply with the court order, citing Swiss bank secrecy law and
customer confidentiality.3
The SEC could have opted to pursue a course of action similar to
the successful one employed in the St. Joe Case. However, the SEC,
acting through the Justice Department, applied for Swiss assistance under
the 1977 United States-Switzerland Treaty for Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, ratified in 1977.231 This treaty established assistance
measures that were specifically developed to allow a requesting country
to obtain necessary information for investigations of offenses committed
within the requesting country's jurisdiction.232 In accordance with the
Treaty, the matter was heard before the Swiss Federal Tribunal, where the
SEC request was initially rejected. Following a second request by the
SEC, the Swiss Federal Tribunal granted the SEC's application. Forty-
one months after the initiation of litigation, the Swiss delivered the
requested information to the SEC. This case reveals that the Treaty was
not helpful to the SEC in its goal of rationalizing securities investigations
with an international element.
In spite of the protracted proceedings, the Santa Fe case
demonstrates that the SEC received the information it requested. More
important, the case substantiates the claim that litigation has the capacity
to induce bank secrecy jurisdictions to enter into specific insider trading
information sharing agreements with the United States. Forcing
disinterested havens to the bargaining table is the genuine benefit of
litigation.
In August 1982, after the St. Joe Case and during the Sante Fe
litigation, the United States and Switzerland agreed on a Memorandum
of Understanding which declared the commitment of both countries to
improve measures established by the 1977 Treaty for use in insider
trading investigations.233 Moreover, these two cases a'vakened the
Swiss insider trading bill, which had rested idle since its introduction
purchaser" as the principal defendant and the Swiss bank as a nominal defendant. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. See 22 I.L.M. 785 (1983) (Swiss decision of the Sante Fe case).
231. Treaty for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
2019 [hereinafter U.S.-Swiss Treaty for Assistance in Criminal Matters].
232. Id. art. 4(1).
233. Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving
International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, United States-
Switzerland, Nov. 3, 1993, 22 I.L.M. 1.
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some ten. years earlier.2 34  Although the Swiss legislation machine
operates at a slow pace, this bill was given priority. The result was the
prohibition of insider trading under article 161 of the Swiss Penal Code
which came into effect in July 1988.235
Interestingly enough, a number of countries enacted or modified
insider trading legislation in the 1980s in the wake of St Joe and Sante
Fe cases and the villainous yet fantastic set of insider trading cases
involving Levine and friends. Jurisdictions that took legislative action
include: (1) Canada; (2) France; (3) Hong Kong; (4) Japan;
(5) Switzerland; (6) the Netherlands; and (7) the United Kingdom.236
The hypothesis could be advanced that the United States provided the
impetus for these changes. In effect, the U.S. government vicariously
effected an international policy goal, namely universal opprobrium of
insider trading, through the legislative bodies of foreign countries-
extraterritoriality par excellence.
The same hypothesis could be proposed regarding the U.S. capacity
to conclude numerous information sharing agreements in an attempt to
achieve a domestic policy goal, namely, the maintenance of fair and
efficient U.S. securities markets in the wake of increased transborder
securities trading. With Switzerland, the traditional haven, neutered, it
is maintained that the Bank of Nova Scotia litigation forced numerous
haven jurisdictions in the Caribbean basin to reassess how they deal with
foreign requests for information. Arguably, Bank of Nova Scotia
prompted mutual assistance treaties between the United States and each
of the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and Jamaica. The Cayman Islands
mutual assistance treaty makes specific provision for releasing
information relating to insider trading offenses. As argued earlier, the
Bahamas MLAT potentially could address insider trading requests. The
Jamaican mutual assistance treaty has no requirement of dual
criminality. 37 Conceivably, then, it is irrelevant to inquire if Jamaica
has outlawed insider trading.
Indeed, the hypothesis that the United States unilaterally controls the
executive and legislative organs of foreign countries is contestable. One
could argue that two or three cases could not categorically prompt an
international review of insider trading legislation or the stimulus to sign
234. W. de Capitani, Banking Secrecy Today, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 65 (1988).
235. M. Mann & L. Lustgarten, Internationalization of Insider Trading Enforcement -A Guide
to Regulation and Co-operation in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING 362 (K. Hopt & E. Wymeersch eds.,
1991).
236. Id. at 362-73.
237. Id.
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information sharing agreements. However, it is conceivable that litigation
as a tool of the securities regulator has the capacity to force all countries
to evaluate how they view securities regulation and how they deal with
the SEC.
G. Summary
In Subpart A, it was stated that the success of the SEC's litigation
efforts would be evaluated. Success is a malleable concept. If success
entails efficiency or economy then the SEC's approach has been
unsuccessful. All three cases were time-consuming and expensive. If
success can be measured by the ability of U.S. courts to render consistent
judgments against offshore banks that refuse to divulge customer identity,
again, the SEC's approach has been unsuccessful. Socigtg Internationale
held that a bank bound by foreign secrecy law, which nevertheless acts
in good faith, may avoid sanctions. In contrast, appellate court judgments
narrowly confine this Supreme Court holding to the particular facts of the
case. The resulting absence of judicial clarity creates manifest
inconvenience for the potential litigant. Justice demands certainty. If,
however, success is equated with the ability of the SEC to further its
agenda of increasing international cooperation in insider trading
investigations, then, a degree of success has been achieved.
IV. Conclusion
Three short sentences identify the crux of the problem discussed in
this article: "Securities regulation is local. But securities trading is
international. It is inevitable, therefore, that there may be collision
between high and low-regulated states." '238 In seeking a solution to the
challenges of international law and foreign relations that emerge from this
conflict of laws, a degree of parochialism and rigidity emerges from both
the disclosure-oriented United States and the secrecy-oriented haven
jurisdictions. In essence, opposing societal values fill the gap between
disclosure and secrecy. The United States, for example, regards bank
secrecy laws as the hallmark of fraud. In contrast, the haven believes
bank secrecy laws are the hallmark of freedom, insofar as financial
privacy begets freedom. As a number of concluded international
agreements attest, however, there is a middle ground on which to
cooperate.
238. P. Wood, Financial Conglomerates and Conflicts of Interest in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
THE CHANGING WORLD 74 (R. Goode ed., 1986).
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The internationalization of securities markets occupies this middle
ground. Through the rapid growth of formerly insignificant securities
markets, as well as the emergence of new securities markets, a plethora
of jurisdictions are now confronted with the issue of transactions shielded
by bank secrecy laws. Moreover, with the integration of securities
markets, insider trading has the potential to affect linked exchanges.
Thus, the concerns of the U.S. regulator have become the concerns of
many regulators. Inevitably, this induces cooperation.
U.S. regulators are equally concerned about the negative effect of
internationalization on domestic markets. Obscure jurisdictions like
Rarotonga and Vanuatu are all too willing to initiate the transactions that
other havens will not. As stated by one scholar: "There has always been
and always will be a huge quantity of international money, owing
allegiance to no particular country, looking for a home where secrecy is
guaranteed." '239  Securities regulators must be responsive to the
dynamics of internationalization if markets are to keep fraud in abeyance.
Litigation, as demonstrated in this article, is not the long term answer.
Although it peeled back the leaves of the palm tree, it was a costly and
inefficient exercise. Cooperation is the way forward. It uproots the tree.
239. F. Neate, Introduction in BANK CONFIDENTnALITY xviii (F. Neate & R. McCormick eds.,
1990).
